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IN SEARCH OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH
THE UNITED STATES'
JUAN REBOLLEDO GOUT
Ladies and gentlemen:
For Mexicans, the United States has been, historically, dream and
nightmare, opportunity and risk. It continues to be so. After the
tormented relationships
of the Nineteenth
Century, many
contemporary Mexicans believe that the best there can be between
Mexico and the United States is desert, a long and dry distance as
barrier against the danger and threat coming from the north. At the
same time, Octavio Paz called the United States at mid-century: "that
place were men breathed with easiness the rare atmosphere of the
future." Reacting to fear or searching for opportunities, Mexico has
always sought an understanding with its powerful neighbor. It was
quite reasonable to do so. More than that, it has been, and still is, a
national imperative.
What do I mean by an understanding between Mexico and the
United States? To "understand" is something of a bridge and something
of shared code. It is a bridge between past and future. In other words,
while both countries should avoid amnesia, both should also refuse to be
devoured by prejudice, to be petrified in the past, to be diluted or
disintegrated in an image that will not last.
To "understand" each other also means to share a common code of
behavior and languages. It means to create rules, practices of behavior
and univocal tools to deal with one another. To reach an understanding
means to achieve specific commitments and responsibilities for each
party in order to accomplish superior objectives, particularly in light of
the states' differing interests and idiosyncrasies.
Therefore,
understanding should leave no place for unilateral impositions or
subjugation.
During the second half of the last century there was a fundamental
understanding between both nations. Mexico did not confront the
United States in its strategic interests and United States did not force
the consent of Mexico, when other non-strategic interests were at stake.
' This paper was originally delivered at the Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law: "NAFTA-Unresolved Issues: Dispute Resolution, Environment,
Labor and Transportation", organized by the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law, in the City of Denver, Colorado, March 30, 2001.
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In the nineteen-nineties, the government of Mexico made a decision
that was to change this fundamental equation. With the decision to
negotiate and to enact a treaty of free trade with the United States and
Canada, Mexico decided to leave aside the concept and reality of
implicit understandings, and boldly move toward a deliberate
agreement. This agreement is built upon mandatory rules in a very
wide group of commercial topics, with important consequences in the
economic regulation of Mexico.
That decision has had many
implications, some of which I shall explore in a few minutes.
The logic behind the decision was momentous but simple: Mexico
would transform itself to reap the benefits of economic globalization and
focus on achieving sustained economic growth.
In the era of
globalization, Mexico should not stand defenseless and in isolation.
In order to recapture a path of stable growth in the early nineteennineties, it was imperative for Mexico to open and deregulate its
economy and to insert itself, in a competitive way, in world trade.
Therefore, since 1985, Mexico has used bilateral, multilateral, and
regional negotiations to improve the conditions for access of its export
products.
The entrance to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1986 was the first important step in Mexico's new strategy of
international negotiations.1 A second step followed with the conclusion
of the "Understanding with the US on Consultations as regards Trade
and Investment" (Framework Agreement) at the end of 1987.2 The
Framework Agreement established a formal outline of principles and
procedures to negotiate reductions in the commercial barriers and to
approach disputes regarding trade and investment.
However, soon enough, it was evident that across-the-board
reductions of the existent commercial barriers could not be achieved
within the General Framework.
The process of sector-by-sector
negotiation is too cumbersome and exhausting and, at best, only
produces marginal results. Indeed, these negotiations did not take into
account inter-sector relationships, prevented global balancing of costs
and benefits, and gave undue influence to special interest groups. On
the other hand, as is well known, GATT requires extending to third
countries any tariff reduction granted under specific sector
negotiations.
The operation of the United States Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) was another important element for Mexico. Nearly
3.5 billion dollars in Mexican products qualified under the GSP in

1. MEXICAN OFFICIAL GAZETrE, November 26,1986
2. Understanding on Consultations as regards Trade and Investment, TIAS Edition,
12395, Mexico, 1987.
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1991. 3 However, the application of the system by the United States had
many discretionary elements. Particularly, the authority to make
exclusions of products if their imports surpass the established limits of
competitiveness, or if an American producer presents a dissent
application for damage caused by foreign imports.4 These discretionary
elements imply that the most competitive products are eliminated
eventually creating uncertainty in exporters and hindering investment
decisions.
On the other hand, although the average tariff to which Mexican
exports were subject when entering the American market was low
(three percent),5 this average blurred a strong dispersion in the
obligations and the existence of important tariff picks.
Many of
Mexico's most competitive products, were subject to tariffs superior to
twenty percent, and others paid rates that oscillated between thirtyeight and seventy-seven percent.6
The biggest obstacle to free access to the Mexican products came
from non-tariff barriers and from the implementation, with protective
purposes, of United States legislation concerning the so-called "disloyal
practices." This was seen in the cases of Mexican cement, of the quotas
established for textiles and steel and of phyto-sanitary norms that
constituted important non-tariff barriers for many agricultural
products. It was also the time when Mexican avocadoes were forbidden
because of the alleged presence worms, which had actually been long
eradicated.
Lastly, it is necessary to remember that the "Omnibus Trade Act"
of 1988 which, by introducing the concept of "unfair trade," opened the
door to new forms of unilateral protectionism.7 In turn, a climate of
harmful uncertainty to the interests of Mexico resulted.
NAFTA is the most suitable mechanism to solve these and other
problems. It allows business deals and investment flows among the
three member countries to have a clear and permanent legal framework
and to have swift dispute settlement mechanisms.
Additionally,
NAFTA has a long-term reach, allowing for differentiated adjusting
periods appropriate to the necessities of the most sensitive sectors,
something that is indispensable to minimize the costs of structural
change.
The political decision to promote NAFTA, in February of 1990,

3. United
States
International
Trade
Commission,
available
at
http//www.dataweb.usitc.gov.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ronald A. Cass, Velvet Fist in an Iron Glove: The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, REGULATION , Vol. 14, no. 1, Winter 1991.
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considered the impact on our country of the increasing resources needed
for structural change in Central and Eastern Europe. 8 The decision was
to stop linking domestic growth to more foreign debt, but to link it
instead to direct investment strategy and to take advantage of an
additional instrument to accelerate the growth of the Mexican economy.
What were, and are, the objectives of NAFTA? Of course, the three
NAFTA partners share some objectives: that of eliminating, or at least
minimizing, sudden changes in the commercial policies of a country
that may affect the interests of their commercial partners or impose
new barriers to trade among those countries. But, within this great
common purpose, different particular objectives contribute to explain
the architecture of the agreement.
For Mexico:
the fundamental objectives were to reduce the
vulnerability and uncertainty for its exporters in order to promote
external sales, to increase investment flows, and to elevate job creation.
At the same time, NAFTA, together with other international
commitments such as the GATT and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development to (OECD), assured, for potential
investors, the sustainability and permanency of the market policies
undertaken in the late nineteen-eighties and early nineteen-nineties.
For the United States: the treaty represents an opportunity for its
companies and workers to recover competitiveness and participate more
efficiently in the world markets. In that sense, its high-priority
objective was to assure access to wider and surer investment
opportunities, and also to participate in the services markets,
traditionally much more closed than the markets of goods. Therefore,
with Mexico as the United States' third commercial partner, the growth
potential of United States exports was significant. That belief was fully
justified as has been proven by the three-fold increase in bilateral trade
since NAFTA negotiations began. 9
For Canada: the main objective was to protect its free trade
agreement with the United States, and to get access to the Mexican
market at least in the same terms as the United States. Particularly,
Canada was interested in safeguarding its position reached in the free
trade agreement, in sectors such as auto-parts and energy. Lastly,
Canada is one of the four important actors in international commercial
negotiations (next to the European Economic Community, Japan and

8. OECD experts estimated a diversion of investment from traditional countries
towards Central European nations. As a matter of fact, the Bank for Reconstruction and
Development was created to channel public and private resources towards that area of the
world. Mexico is a founding member of the Bank. OECD, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 1990.
9. In 1992, total trade between Mexico and the U.S. was 82,869 million. By year
2000 total trade jumped to 275,660 million. 2001, despite resetion in both counries, trade
amounted to 254,071 million. Banco de Mexico ANNUAL REPORT 2001.

2001

IN SEARCH OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE U.S.

the United States) and in and of itself, it could not allow, for strategic
and historical reasons, to remain outside of NAFTA. A preservation of
status seems then to have been another important element to assure a
place at the NAFTA table of negotiations.
Having said all of this, it is crucial to understand NAFTA in its
double relevance: it is only a trade treaty (much less than a custom
union or a common market, and nothing near much broader projects,
such as the "Maastricht Treaty" in Europe). But it is also, by its
influence, more than a simple trade treaty.
Until recently, Mexico and the United States lived and maintained
problems perceived as "intractable" in their daily contacts. The most
significant ones are the migration of Mexicans to the US, the problems
of violence and infrastructure at the border, the fight against drug
trafficking and organized international crime, the environmental
dilemmas, and some regional and multilateral matters. In spite of their
importance, these topics were not fully recognized as a daily part of the
bilateral agenda. Dealt with in a discrete and unsystematic way, the
silence was occasionally broken by partial agreements, political storms
and, by periods of sour publicity in the media.
What changed and why did it change? To answer this question one
must remember that NAFTA produced a major contribution to Mexico's
financial stability in the spring of 1995, when the United States
administration and the international community committed support to
Mexico for almost 50 billion dollars.'0 By January 1997 Mexico repaid
all of the United States package and part of International Monetary
Mexico's trade with the United States and
Fund (IMF) support."
Canada soared. The crisis was averted and the path of steady growth2
reached its peak in the year 2000 at an impressive seven percent.
Most of the growth was fueled by the external sector and half of all new
jobs were due to exporting businesses.
Also, we now know that NAFTA had unsuspected and somehow
paradoxical economic results. Starting from their negotiations, the
interest in Mexico of the European Community, Japan and its
commercial allies in the Asian Pacific grew enormously. That interest
and attention have been translated into a General Agreement and a
Free Trade Agreement with the European Union and into exploratory
conversations toward the same purpose with Japan.
The economic success was very impressive, but it also held

10. Banco de Mexico ANNUAL REPORT, 1996.
11. Id. Mexico used, out of 20 billion of U.S.support, only 11 billion paid in 1995 and
1996, providing the U.S., with 500 million profits. Out of the 50 billion, Mexico used
27,159 in 1995.
12. Real growth for 2000 was 6.9%, 3.2 points better than 1999. Banco de Mexico
ANNUAL REPORT 2001.
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important lessons beyond economics. Three elements were important
in overall terms: the high level attention this process implied; the
shared value of certainty attached to pre-established rules, and the
operation of institutionalized mechanisms. It was only natural for
NAFTA partners to look into other areas of their complex relationships
with this experience in mind. From 1995 onward Mexico has attempted
"treat intractables" with this frame of mind.
It moved to give
transparency to those difficult issues in the agendas; to create
institutional mechanisms to solve them or to administer them; and to
endow them with long-term goals that represented an elevation of the
political dialogue and the creation of more favorable conditions to solve
them in the future.
Considering the inescapable fact that Mexico and the United States
weigh considerably in the life of the "other," both have finally come to
terms with the importance of a shared framework appropriate for the
dynamics of daily interaction; one that surpasses, by far, the vertical
decisions of politics, of bureaucracies and of their personalities.
Of course, "between the idea and the reality, between the
movement and the act, falls the shade," said T.S. Elliot. In that space
lies the laboratory of diplomacy; "plumbing diplomacy," is a diplomacy
which is quiet, which is concerned with details, which does not rest in
unnecessary political noise, which believes in effectiveness.
As it happened, in five years (1995-2000), a whole network of
agreements emerged. This meant qualitative change in relationships.
Four approaches guided that change:
1.

The creation of bilateral rules in practically all of the areas of
the relationship, subtracting uncertainty and offering
mechanisms for the administration of cooperation and conflict;

2. The flexibility to grant a differentiated handling of the most
conflicting topics regarding the rest of the agenda; without
disassociating them from the framework of global conception of
the relationship;
3.

The adoption of long term visions to generate an agenda for the
future; and,

4.

To privilege high-level political consultations to avoid surprises
and to foresee reactions on each side.

Since 1995, twenty-two treaties and forty-six executive agreements
have been signed between Mexico and the United States. 13 Both
administrations created nearly thirty-five bilateral mechanisms that

13. Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, INFORME DE LABORES 2001, Mexico D.F.,
2001.
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duplicated in number the pre-existent ones."' But beyond numbers,
what is meant is that we moved from general dispositions in many
topics to something much closer to what NAFTA made for trade and
investment, that is objectives, strategies, mechanisms and task forces.
Therefore, Mexico can now deal with crisis without bringing the whole
relationship down. What all of this meant was that we began to put
perspective in each area, agreeing on the desirable scenarios for the
future.
Furthermore, high level encounters outside government structures
are now almost part of a binational routine. The members of the
Congresses of both nations frequently travel and meet. The federal
judicial powers have established contacts and developed exchange
programs for judges. Academics, managers, journalists and the Non
Governmental Organizations' (NGO) have also knitted a dense network
of contacts. Indeed, the high level and increased amount of bilateral
dialogue has changed dramatically in the last few years and it promises
to continue to do so.
Clearly, this it is not a story of kindness. Without a doubt, NAFTA
partners felt the negative impact of very serious incidents that
reminded us what the bilateral relationship should not be. The
commercial conflicts, hidden behind environmental concerns, such as
the continued embargo against Mexican tuna, the permanency of the
annual drug certification, the relative impunity of police violence
against Mexican migrants, the permanent pretense of taking the long
arm of the law - but only that of United States law - and to apply it to
Mexico and to Mexicans, are all examples of old practices and reflect the
worst aspects of the bilateral relationship. They are the result of old
attitudes and of a blindness that refuses to die.
It is a relationship, inevitably, with lights and shades, but a
relationship with a promissory future. Allow me to mention two
examples of how NAFTA partially modeled a constructive approach to
some difficult topics or, as I have labeled them, the "intractables:"
migration and drugs.
When dealing with our migrations problems one has to consider the
three thousand kilometers of open border, the police operatives of
border control and the concomitant growth of people's trafficking by
organized crime, the restrictive terms of the 1996 American migratory
law (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act),
the income disparities, the local traditions to migrate, the social
networks for undocumented people deep in US territory, and the
expansion of the communities of Mexican origin in the United States,
among other factors. No wonder this phenomenon is one particularly

14. Id.
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difficult to administer and prone to conflict.
What we wanted in Mexico was to escape from an approach that
concentrated solely on the duality "border control/human rights
defense." Both are indispensable ingredients of the migratory agenda,
however, they are far from the only issues involved. There are also
topics of consular access to the migrants, family reunification, secure
and orderly repatriations, interstate transfers and repatriation of
people, special treatment of prisoners about to be released in the
border, the fights against traffickers of people and against the
falsification of documents, dealing with serious border incidents and
with the use of lethal force at the border, the relative impunity of local
and federal agents involved in those incidents, the use of ethnic
approaches for detentions and industrial inspections, etc.
What we therefore created was a high level mechanism that
created rules for most topics involved in the phenomena of migration
and, at a regional level, we incorporated our experiences and ideas in a
mechanism where, besides Mexico and the United States, Central
American countries and Canada are also represented. As a support of
the Bilateral High Level Mechanism, ten Liaison Mechanisms for
Border Matters had 160 meetings to solve many violent incidents and
abuses, to ensure orderly and safe repatriations, as well as to speed up
legal crossings.15
Also, at the beginning of 1996, twenty-two
Consultation Mechanisms were created to assure the permanent
communication between Mexican Consuls and district
authorities of the
16
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Is that effort sufficient? Well, it still does not look like a NAFTA
deal. Yet it lays the groundwork for a wider agreement or, more
realistically, for a set of various agreements in order to deal with this
phenomena in a more orderly, rational and humane way. Mexican
President Vincent Fox's administration has reiterated its commitment
to high-level discussions to explore more far-reaching agreements to
deal with the problem. As a matter of fact, in a few weeks cabinet
members of both countries will meet for that purpose. The fundamental
structures and mechanisms are already there to make those discussions
possible and productive. We shall all hope for their success.
In the also difficult topic of drugs, in the last years a simple but
fundamental agreement was reached among the key players in the
respective government spheres. Mexico looked for, and achieved, the
enlargement of the agenda and the institutionalization of the
cooperation efforts.

15. Id.
16. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Informe de Labores 1999-2000, p. 1 9 . Mexico
D.F., 2000
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The High Level Contact Group (HLCG) was created, together with
several groups of experts on all topics relevant to this problem,
including the demand for drugs and the trafficking of weapons from
north to south. The HLCG has elevated the level of political attention
to the problem, something which has made it feasible both to set a
course to the bilateral relationship in that matter, and to administer
delicate situations. A common view of the complexity of the problem, a
bilateral strategy, and an agreed upon measure of effectiveness, were
the most significant contributions.
Also, Mexico proposed an
Extraordinary Meeting of the UN General Assembly and moved for the
creation of the Multilateral Mechanism of Evaluation including all
countries in the hemisphere.
Ladies and gentlemen:
What then are the lessons of these past experiences? I believe that,
in order to better understand and manage the relationship, it is
necessary to discard two harmful concepts: the belief in illusory models
and the fatality of conflict. The objective should be to build a modern
and
functional
relationship
that
allows
ongoing progress.
Responsibility and objectivity should take the place of prejudice and
emotional reactions, as we did for trade through NAFTA.
NAFTA symbolizes, beyond trade, a posture towards the future. It
is so because it is an exemplary practical arrangement that is based on
common sense, tolerance and respect to work out our differences.
And even though in life nothing should be taken for granted, there
is ground for optimism and, above all, there will always be space for
imagination to conceive a grown, mature and productive neighborhood.

